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Patients in Vegetative State (VS), also known as Unresponsive Wakefulness State (UWS) are 
deemed to be unaware of themselves or their environment. This is different from patients 
diagnosed with Minimally Conscious state (MCS), who can have intermittent awareness. In 
both states, there is a severe impairment of consciousness; these disorders are referred to as 
disorders of consciousness (DOC) and if the state is prolonged, pDOC. There is growing 
evidence that some patients who are behaviourally in VS/UWS can show neural activation to 
environmental stimuli and that this response can be detected using functional brain imaging 
(fMRI/PET) and electroencephalography (EEG). Recently, it has also been suggested that a 
more reliable detection of brain responsiveness and hence a more reliable differentiation 
between VS/UWS and MCS requires person-centred and person-specific stimuli, such as the 
subject’s own name stimulus. 
In this study we obtained event related potential data (ERP) from 12 healthy subjects and 16 
patients in pDOC, five of whom were in the VS/UWS and 11 in the Minimally Conscious State 
(MCS). We used as the ERP stimuli the subjects’ own name, others’ names and reversed other 
names. We performed a sensor level analysis using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) 
software. Using this paradigm in 4 DOC patients (3 in MCS, and 1 in VS/UWS) we detected a 
statistically significant difference in EEG response to their own name versus other peoples’ 
names with ERP latencies (~300ms and ~700ms post stimuli). Some of these differences were 















This study shows the feasibility of using self-relevant stimuli such as a subject’s own name for 
assessment of brain function in pDOC patients. This neurophysiological test is suitable for bed-
side/hospital based assessment of pDOC patients. As it does not require sophisticated scanning 
equipment it can feasibly be used within a hospital or care setting to help professionals tailor 

















Previously, patients who emerged from coma following a severe brain injury, into a state of 
wakefulness but unresponsiveness were diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State (VS) (Jennett 
and Plum 1972), also called the Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS) (Laureys, 
Celesia et al. 2010). Later it became apparent that this group of patients is heterogeneous and 
that some patients demonstrate self-awareness and environmental awareness, albeit in an 
inconsistent manner. Hence, a new diagnostic term of Minimally Conscious State (MCS) was 
introduced by Giacino et al. (Giacino, Ashwal et al. 2002) in order to distinguish this patient 
group form those in the VS/UWS state. Both types of patients (UWS and MCS) are now said 
to suffer from a Disorder of Consciousness (DOC) or prolonged Disorder of Consciousness 
(pDOC), which recognizes that the two sub-types exist on a continuum (Turner-Stokes 2014). 
Furthermore, some VS/UWS patients defined by behavioural criteria can show a degree of 
awareness, and could be thought of as being in a “functional locked-in syndrome” rather than 
in VS or UWS (Coleman, Rodd et al. 2007; Coleman, Davis et al. 2009) (Owen, Coleman et 
al. 2006; Monti, Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2010; Boly, Garrido et al. 2011; Formisano, D'Ippolito 
et al. 2013). It has been estimated that approximately 10% of the patients with a diagnosis of 
VS/UWS, have some preserved higher brain function (Turner-Stokes, Kitzinger et al. 2012).  
The methods for detecting unexpected levels of self-awareness have relied on technological 
approaches such as functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) or 
electroencephalography (EEG), rather than clinical rating scores that rely on observations of 
the patient’s externally expressed behaviour (Coleman, Davis et al. 2009; Cruse, Chennu et al. 
2011). A particularly salient auditory stimulus is the subject’s own name (SON) (Moray 1959) 















higher-level brain function in pDOC patients (Cavinato, Volpato et al. 2011; Cruse, Beukema 
et al. 2014), (Risetti, Formisano et al. 2013). The EEG brain responses to a SON are assessed 
using event related potentials (ERP). ERP responses to SON auditory stimuli in healthy adults’ 
subjects have two main components that occur around 250 ms and 800 ms post stimulus; these 
are called the early and late response, respectively. These are of positive polarity and are widely 
distributed over the frontal and parietal areas (Polich 2007; Hauger, Schnakers et al. 2015). 
Both responses are considered to represent cognitive potentials. The early response is deemed 
to reflect cognitive functions such as stimulus recognition and working memory updating 
(Coles, Gratton et al. 1988), (Polich 1987), while the late response is believed to occur during 
recollection and retrieval processes (Holeckova, Fischer et al. 2006). Researchers have used a 
variety of different paradigms to elicit name-specific ERPs. More passive paradigms (such as 
the one we utilize) have been shown to identify greater responses to others’ names than own 
name in control participants, particularly affecting the P300 component (Hauger, Schnakers et 
al. 2015). 
The aim of our study was to assess the brain responses to a SON paradigm in patients with 
pDOC to see if we could identify subjects, at either the group or single-subject level, who had 




















Twelve healthy, right-handed volunteers, five female, mean age of 39.09 years, (SD =5.26) 
were included. None had suffered from neurological or psychiatric disorders or brain injury; 
none were taking psychotropic medications. 
Prolonged Disorders of Consciousness Patients 
We recruited 16 patients from the Royal Hospital for Neuro-disability in London, UK. This 26-
bedded unit provides a comprehensive neuro-rehabilitation programme for patients with DOC 
in the post-acute phase following severe brain injury (GCS<8).  
The patient inclusion criteria were as follows: 1) severe acquired brain injury leading to 
prolonged DOC (longer than 4 weeks since brain injury) or permanent DOC. A permanent 
DOC was defined according to the Royal College of Physician Guidance (RCP 2013), that is, 
lasting longer than 12 months if the aetiology is trauma, or longer than 6 months for anoxia 
and other causes; 2) conservative management of brain injury (no neurosurgery); 3) at least 
unilaterally intact brainstem auditory evoked potentials (BAEP). 
All patients were assessed using The Sensory Modality Assessment and Rehabilitation 
Technique (SMART) (Gill-Thwaites and Munday 2004). The SMART scale scores responses 
to sensory and environmental stimuli during ten one-to-one (patient-assessor) sessions lasting 
approximately 60 minutes each. In all patients, the diagnosis of VS/UWS or MCS remained 















Written informed consent was obtained from all the control subjects and an assent from the 
relatives of the patients prior to the study. The investigation was carried out in accordance with 
the latest version of the Declaration of Helsinki and the study was approved by a National 
Research Ethics Committee (NRES Committee London-Queen Square, REC reference number 
11/LO/1233, SSA reference number 11/LO/2052). 
 
Experimental paradigm 
During the experiment three types of auditory stimuli were presented: i) SON, ii) other names 
and iii) time-reversed other names. There were three block types: others’ names, reversed 
names and rest (no auditory stimuli). Each block was started with an auditory cue, recorded by 
the same male voice as used for all names in this experiment “listen to the following names”. 
Two SON trials were randomly inserted in the two auditory blocks (others’ and reversed names, 
see Figure 1), so that they would be flanked by acoustically similar but semantically varying 
stimuli in the block. The auditory stimuli were presented in blocks totalling 15 stimuli each. 
The inter-stimulus interval was fixed at 2000 ms. Each auditory block lasted for 35.5 secs and 
was followed by a 10 sec long rest block. Twenty-two blocks were presented producing in total 
for each subject 44 SON trials, 143 others’ name trials and 143 reversed name trials. The 
duration of the auditory stimuli ranged from 292ms to 736ms, average = 500ms. During the 
recoding the patients remained awake and if case of drowsiness an activation protocol was used 
as described by Giacino (Giacino, Kalmar et al. 2004). 
We focused our analyses on the contrast of own name vs. others’ names because these two 















contain both phonological and semantic information but mainly differ in terms of semantic 
salience (Arnell, Shapiro et al. 1999). While reversed names offer a good acoustic control (they 
are broadband stimuli) and contain some phonological elements of normal speech, they differ 
in both their phonological form (in particular phonotactics) as well as their lexico-semantic 
content (Leff, Schofield et al. 2008). 
 
 
Figure 1 Auditory paradigm, each activation block lasted for 35.5 sec, 15 stimuli per block with the random 
presentation of two SONs and 13 other stimuli or reversed names, in total 22 blocks were presented, 11 with 
the other names and 11 with reversed names. 
 
The auditory stimuli (names) were recorded by a male native English speaker using a Magix 
music editor version 2.0 and the audio files were edited using the Praat software (free computer 
software developed by Paul Boersma and David Weenink, from the Institute of Phonetic 
Sciences - University of Amsterdam). The reversed name stimuli were simply time reversed 
other names used in this experiment (the spectrogram was reflected across the midpoint of the 















143 times. The stimuli were delivered binaurally through earphones using evoke software 3.1.5 
(ANT Neuro, Enscheda, The Netherlands) with sound levels set to 70 dB. 
EEG Data registration and analysis 
The EEG data were acquired using a Waveguard 64 EEG sensor-cap (ANT-Neuro, Enscheda, 
the Netherlands) (Figure 2) whose standard sensor positions were derived from the 10-20 
system (Jasper, 1958) with additional positions being determined from the 10-10 electrode 
placement system (Koessler, Maillard et al. 2009). The EEG sensors were configured in a 
bipolar montage. The online filtering regime was 0.53-40Hz, without mains suppression; data 
was sampled at 512Hz. Online sensitivity was set to 70uV/cm and a ground electrode was 

















Figure 2 The EEG cap layout, the top figures shows frontal, top and lateral view of the cap, the bottom figure 
shows the 10-20 layout with an additional 10-10 electrodes, the layout provided by the ANT-Neuro, Enscheda, 
the Netherlands. 
 
The data was analysed using the Statistical Parametric Software (SPM 8, the Welcome Trust 
Centre for Neuroimaging, UCL, London, UK). The EEG data were converted from the *cnt 
format to the readable by SPM8 run using Matlab (Matlab version R2011a, Mathworks, Natick 
MA). The converted EEG data was subjected to a high-pass filter of 1Hz to eliminate slow drift 















movement correction) was performed. At this stage 2 out of 12 healthy subjects’ and 1 out of 
16 pDOC data sets were excluded from the further analysis due to excessive eye movement 
artefacts. Subsequently three epochs were created for each of the three conditions: SON, other 
names and reversed names with the epoch beginning 100ms before the stimulus onset and 
ending 1000ms later. The data were then low pass filtered at 30Hz to eliminate muscle artefact 
and the EEG gamma frequency band. Subsequently 3D images were created for each trial, to 
represent changes of the scalp recorded potentials in scalp space (two dimensions, X and Y) 
over the peri-stimulus time (z dimension). (Litvak, Mattout et al. 2011). A single image per 
trial contained information about the electrical signal in µV. For the controls, the data was 
taken to a second level of analysis, where one- way-ANOVA with R-levels and F-test was 
performed. The contrast between responses to own name versus responses to other names was 
examined for statistical differences, since this contrast was deemed as the most indicative of 
the self-awareness. The results were assessed with an F test for differences of either polarity. 
The results were initially thresholded at p=0.001 uncorrected with a family wise error 
correction (FWE) correction based on random field theory (Litvak, Mattout et al. 2011). As the 
whole epoch lasted 1100ms and we were not expecting ERP responses throughout this entire 
time, we used two time defined volumes of interest at 250-350ms and 600-800ms post-
stimulus. These masks were applied within SPM as a small volume correction (effectively the 
whole of sensor-space over these two-time windows). Only those regions, that survived a FWE 
correction of p <.05 corrected for multiple comparisons within these windows are reported 
(Litvak, Mattout et al. 2011). As F tests identify differences between two conditions but do not 
indicate the directionality of effect, we plotted out the data for each significant response in 
controls (as a group, see figure 3 and table 1) and patients (individually, see figures 4 and 5, 
and table 3). This analysis is in accordance with that suggested by Rousselet et al. (Rousselet, 















stimulus time. For illustrative purposes only, ERPs were averaged across electrodes (and for 
controls across subjects) to produce grand mean ERPs for figures 3 and 5. 
 
Results 
EEG responses to SON in control population 
The F test differences between responses to the SON and other names averaged for 10 controls 
were calculated. The table indicates all significant responses within the two-time windows of 
250 to 350ms and 600 to 800ms post stimuli and the graphical presentation of sensor 
space*time (Figure 3 and Table 1). Note that the response to others’ names was greater than 
own name centrally at ~300ms (positive polarity), while the later, left-lateralized response at 



















 Figure 3 Results of F test difference between responses to own name and other names within the window of -
100ms to 1000ms in per stimulus time.  The red arrow indicates the most significant response from Healthy 
control subjects (n=10), using an F test to contrast ‘own name’ against ‘others’ names’ A) Early response 250-
350ms (midline frontal), B) Late response 600-800ms, (left superior parietal), C) ERP response 250-350ms to 


















Table 1. The responses from the healthy controls (n=10) showing the difference between responses to SON vs. 
other names. The result was considered as significant if the correction using familywise error (FWE) and false 
discovery rate (FDR) were <.05; the mm x mm shows the spatial position and ms indicates the time since onset 
for the most significant response.* positions taken from (Koessler, Maillard et al. 2009) 
 
























































Study population characteristics 
Sixteen patients with pDOC were included in the study (six female, mean age was 46 years, 
SD 11), with the following aetiologies: intracerebral haemorrhage (n=6), anoxic brain injury 
(n=5), traumatic brain injury (n=4) and tuberculosis meningitis (n=1). The patients had been in 

















Table 2 Demographic data and characteristics of the study population. VS/UWS-vegetative state/Unresponsive 
Wakefulness State, MCS-minimally conscious state, pDOC prolonged Disorders, of Consciousness, * all 










Aetiology  Resting state EEG 
1 MCS F 18 4.7 Anoxic brain injury  
low amplitude without distinguishable 
features 
2 MCS F 61 55.1 Right frontal lobe bleed 
polymorphic activity at 2-2.5Hz, small 
amount of beta activity at 16-18Hz 
3 MCS M 55 9.1 Large intracerebral bleed 
diffuse polymorphic at 1.5-3.0Hz, with 
low amplitude at 5-6Hz superimposed, 
small amount of 18-20Hz frontal 
bilaterally 
4 VS/UWS M 45 5.4 
Anoxic brain injury post 
cardiac arrest 
low amplitude and without 
distinguishable features 
5 MCS M 68 4.0 
Grade V SAH due to 
aneurysm left ACM 
Diffuse activity at 1.0-1.5Hz, rhythm at 
8.5Hz superimposed over post central 
regions 




supressed posterior rhythm, frontal 
derivation 4-6Hz rhythm 




asymmetrical R>L, activity 5-7Hz 
8 MCS F 30 80.9 
Petechial haemorrhage 
following road traffic 
accident 
asymmetrical, diffuse activity at 1.5-3Hz, 
occasional  activity at 6Hz central 
9 MCS F 37 1.8 
Bilateral intracerebral 
bleed 
well- formed posterior rhythm 4-6Hz 
10 VS/UWS M 24 6.4 
Hydrocephalus following 
TB meningitis 
slow activity at 1-3Hz, occasionally over 
right centro- temporal regions 4.0-4.5Hz 
11 VS/UWS M 20 13.6 
Diffuse axonal injury 
following road traffic 
accident  
diffuse polymorphic activity at 1.5-
3.0Hz,with low amplitude  at 5-6Hz 
12 VS/UWS M 51 40.4 
Right temporo-parietal 
bleed 
over both hemispheres activity at 5-6Hz, 
focal activity at 4-2.5Hz over the right 
superior frontal region 
13 VS/UWS F 62 5.0 
Anoxic brain injury post 
cardiac arrest 
symmetrical, low voltage activity mainly 
3-4Hz 
14 MCS M 52 6.4 
Left parietal 
haemorrhage following 
road traffic accident  
activity at 5-6Hz over central  
15 MCS F 31 26.0 
Anoxic brain injury 
following cardiac arrest  
low amplitude activity at 2-4Hz  
occasional  activity at 7 Hz central 
16 MCS M 53 4.4 
Anoxic brain injury 
following cardiac arrest 

















Our inclusion criterion for hearing ability was that each patient had at least unilateral positive 
brainstem auditory potentials. The BAEPs values were delayed (Supplement material Table 3) 
in 10 out of 16 prolonged DOC subjects with the mean time for inter-peak I to III of 2.55ms, 
the reference value for normal subjects is 2.2ms (Tusa, Stewart et al. 1994). A similar delay 
was observed for the interpeak III-V, which in the pDOC patients was 2.1ms, while the 
reference is 1.93ms (Tusa, Stewart et al. 1994), the interpeak I to V was only slightly delayed 
in the study population to 4.44ms vs. 4.13ms as a reference value (Tusa, Stewart et al. 1994). 
 
 
EEG responses to SON in pDOC patients 
At the group level there were no significant differences between pDOC patients’ responses to 
SON and other names. At the single subject level, however, we identified 4 pDOC patients (of 
the 15), who demonstrated significant responses between their own name vs. others’ names. 
Two of these patients (numbered as: 2MCS and 16MCS) had responses very similar to controls 
in both timing and the positive polarity of the ERPs, while the other two patients (13VS/UWS 
and 15MCS) had statistically significant effects in the same time windows, but the direction of 
the effect was of the opposite polarity to controls (negative ERP to others’ names) (Figures 4 


















Figure 4 Results of F test difference between responses to own name and other names within the window of -100ms to 
1000ms. Early (250-350ms) response and late (600-800ms) response in four pDOC patients showing the F test results with 
the statistical significant differences between responses to own name vs. responses to other names. The red arrow indicates 
the most significant response indicating the spatial position of the most significant responses. VS/UWS- Vegetative 












































Table 3 The responses from the four patients with the pDOC showing the difference between responses to SON vs. other 
names. The mm x mm shows the spatial position in MNI coordinates NB: -x value = left; -y value = behind the anterior 
commissure and ms indicates the time since stimulus onset for the most significant response. * according to (Koessler, 




Individual patient analyses 
cluster level data 




























in Fig 5 
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Our primary aim was to identify brain responses to subject’s own name (SON) and others’ 
names. We accomplished this by embedding SON stimuli in blocks of either others’ names or 
reversed names to be sure that ERPs were in response to transient changes in the acoustic signal 
rather than fluctuations in brain state that may confound blocked experimental trials. We chose 
the contrast SON vs. others’ names as these were the most similar conditions and differed in 
semantic salience. While the reversed names were part of the experimental paradigm, we did 
not contrast these trials directly with SON trials because any ERP differences could have been 
driven by either semantic or phonotactics differences. We did however utilize the SON trials 
that were embedded in the reversed name blocks. For the 10 control subjects we identified two 
main positive responses in keeping with previous studies: A) an early polarity positive response 
around 300ms, which is typically maximal in the frontal or central midline electrodes (Berlad 
and Pratt 1995); B) a later, also polarity positive, ERP between 600-800ms, also known as a 
“late slow wave” with left parietal topology (Holeckova, Fischer et al. 2006). The early 
response is deemed to reflect cognitive functions such as stimulus recognition and working 
memory updating (Coles, Gratton et al. 1988), (Polich 1987), while the late response is believed 
to occur during recollection and retrieval processes (Holeckova, Fischer et al. 2006). The 
topology of these two responses in our control subjects was consistent with the earlier studies 
cited above i.e. central for the early response and left-lateralized (parietal) for the later 
response. The magnitude and polarity of the effect (with others’ names having a greater ERP 
response than SON) at 300ms is consistent with other passive paradigms (where subjects are 
asked to not attend specifically to the auditory stimuli (Hauger et al. 2015)). We chose a passive 















with a more active paradigm (e.g.: one where they are asked to count the number of times that 
they hear their own name). 
In our patient group, 4/16 (25%) had statistically significant responses to SON vs others’ 
names. Two had a very similar topology to controls while two had an opposite polarity in 
response to others’ names. Two pDOC patients had significant response in both time windows, 
while one subject only had an early response. The final responder had two peaks occurring a 
little earlier than the controls. The topology (given that these patients had all suffered some 
form of global brain injury) was reasonably consistent with the control data, with most patients 
having a maximal response centrally for the early component (although one was quite posterior 
e.g.: 2MCS) and left-lateralized topography for the later response (2/3). We focused 
specifically on the difference in response to subject’s own name and the response to other first 
names; because we think this contrast is the most sensitive to detecting recognition of 
personalized information. 
Our study extends, those performed previously studies in this field through focussing on a 
salient contrast i.e. that between SON and others names. Fisher et al (Fischer, Dailler et al. 
2008) assessed comatose rather that pDOC patients and found in 21 out of 51 a positive ERP 
to subject’s own name at the latency of 602ms, 671ms and 722ms at Fz, Cz and Pz respectively. 
Others showed that pDOC patients had stronger ERP response to own name uttered by familiar 
voice (Holeckova, Fischer et al. 2006) (Del Giudice, Blume et al. 2016). Additionally, it was 
shown that pDOC patients in active condition such as counting down the SONs evoked stronger 
response then in unattended (passive) condition (Schnakers, Giacino et al. 2015) (Hauger, 
Schnakers et al. 2015). Furthermore, a strong response to a SON in pDOC patients was reported 















Previously, Perrin et al (Perrin, Schnakers et al. 2006) and Schnakers et al (Schnakers, Perrin 
et al. 2008) showed that pDOC patients developed a delayed P300 response to SON, for 
instance, in VS patients the P300 was at 762ms, in MCS at 711ms, respectively.  
Significant differences between brain responses to own versus others’ names are unlikely to be 
due to any low-level auditory or even phonemic factors, but more plausibly to higher-level 
(auditory object) (Snyder, Gregg et al. 2012) detection, or to the personal and emotional 
salience associated with hearing one’s own name; hence, the positive results we observed in a 
sub-group of patients may be an index of a certain level of self-awareness. In our study, the 
VS/UWS patient who demonstrated consistent an ERP response to his/her own name was 
diagnosed using the SMART assessment, and was not thought to have any behavioural 
responses indicating self-awareness, or awareness of the environment. The clinical EEG of this 
patient was dominated by delta rhythm, yet they had normal BAEPs and a significant ERP 
(albeit of the opposite polarity to controls) for others’ names vs SON. This finding is supportive 
of previous studies, strongly suggesting that a minority of VS/UWS patients have islands of 
preserved cognitive function (Formisano, D'Ippolito et al. 2013).  
Various psychological experiments have shown that hearing one’s own name can lead to an 
increase in attention. For instance, by using shadowing procedures or distractions, Howarth 
and Ellis (Howarth and Ellis 1961) showed that the auditory threshold for perceiving one’s 
own name was lower than for hearing other names. Others have suggested that there is a 
connection between one’s name, personal identity, memory and attention (Dion 1983). The 
finding of a smaller ERP to the subject’s own name is consistent with the predictive coding 
account of brain function that postulates that familiar stimuli are recognised more efficiently 















information) being quashed more quickly and efficiently than those from unexpected or 
unpredictable stimuli (such as other peoples’ names) (Garrido, Kilner et al. 2009).  
The finding of a negative polarity response to others’ names in two of the patients (13VS at 
267 = -2.1mV; 15MCS at 350 = -4.1 mV, see figure 5 and table 3) was surprising and difficult 
to interpret, although a similar result is reported by Schnakers et al (Schnakers, Perrin et al. 
2008) for DOC patients when listening passively to others’ names (see Figure 5) with a 
negative peaking at around 400ms = -2.5mV. Perhaps, in these subjects, others’ names are 
eliciting a form of MMN compared to own name (in our paradigm others’ names were never 
interspersed with reversed names, as SON stimuli were). 
Recently has it been proposed that proper assessment of brain function in pDOC patients 
requires person specific and person relevant stimuli. These stimuli, may be not only as 
mentioned above an auditory (SON); but can be visual, where pictures of one’s own face are 
contrasted with unfamiliar faces (Laureys, Perrin et al. 2007). Clinic studies further suggest 
that person-relevant stimuli may be best for bedside and behavioural assessment. Cheng et al 
(Cheng, Gosseries et al. 2013) showed in eighty six VS/UWS subjects that using the patient’s 
own name as opposed to a meaningless loud sound (i.e., ringing a bell), was more effective in 
evoking a localisation-to-sound response (i.e., turning eyes/head towards the sound source). 
Others have also suggested using personally meaningful stimuli for brain function assessment 
in pDOC patients, for instance, by using pre-injury personally relevant stimuli, such as patients’ 
favourite music or similar (Perrin, Castro et al. 2015). 
Nevertheless, the sensitivity of the use of EEG for detection of awareness is limited. It is known 















paradigms (Cruse, Chennu et al. 2012; Schnakers, Giacino et al. 2015). In our study only 3 out 
of 10 MCS patients responded. A multi-dimensional approach for an EEG assessment of brain 
function in pDOC patient using SON stimuli amongst others such as temporal attention, spatial 
attention, motor planning and detection of spatial incongruence may better access awareness 
in pDOC patients who are functionally locked in (Sergent, Faugeras et al. 2017). Recently, it 
was shown that the low-frequency power, EEG complexity, and information exchange derived 
from the EEG were deemed as reliable features of consciousness in patients with disorders of 
consciousness (King, Sitt et al. 2013) King and others (Sitt, King et al. 2014) suggested using 
EEG to assess an information sharing and signal propagation across distant sites of cortex, 
which can distinguish patients with various degree of consciousness impairment. The authors 
showed that information sharing was significantly lower in the VS/UWS patients regardless of 
aetiology of brain injury and time since onset. Not only EEG but also other methods such the 
transcranial magnetic stimulation technique and a Perturbational Complexity Index enables 
stratification patients into groups of VS/UWS versus MCS with high specificity and sensitivity 
(Casarotto, Comanducci et al. 2016). 
An important limitation of the present study is that only 25% patients responded to a name 
paradigm and spatial localization of the responses was inconsistent within the subjects. 
However, this may be partially explained by the fact that we aimed to find the difference in 
brain responses to own name and other names. The EEG  responses to this contrast have been 
localized within the superior medial frontal, temporal and parietal cortices that can be activated 
during self-referred stimuli (Knyazev 2013).  
Another limitation of this study is that EEG signal was not reconstructed to assess cortical 















shown that cortical processes implies a fast and effective dialogue between differentiated 
cortical areas. Salient stimuli, such as patient’s own name can cause activation of subcortical 
structures, for instance, locus coeruleus. This would be, however, considered only as a 
preparation of cortical circuits for high-level cognitive processes, rather the actual cognitive 
processes. Hypothetically, a response in VS/UWS patients can be just caused the activation of 
subcortical structures, as the locus coeruleus, which prepare cortical circuits for high-level 
cognitive processes (Sara and Bouret).  Hence, the fMRI technique is superior because of 
spacial localization of the BOLD signal. A fMRI study showed widespread activation to the 
SON of the posterior network: the middle temporal cortex, left superior temporal cortex, middle 
occipital gyrus and cuneus as well in frontal cortex (Carmody and Lewis 2006). The feasibility 
of the use of fMRI and SON stimuli for the outcome prediction in TBI VS/UWS patients was 
shown by Wang et al (Wang, Di et al. 2015). Since both techniques are complementary, the 




The results from our study suggest that names can be powerful stimuli for brain function 
assessment in pDOC patients, especially, if the response to SON is contrasted to a response to 
any other name. One out of five VS/UWS patients responded to this stimulus, indicating at 
least partial self-awareness. This study shows that EEG can be a robust technique for brain 
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1.    Approximately 25% of patients in disorders of consciousness retain ability to respond 
to own first name using electroencephalography 
2. Timing and topography of these responses is in keeping with control subjects data 
3 The use semantically salient stimuli, such as one's own name may give additional 
information when assessing brain function in pDOC patients 
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